International Terrorism

If you are familiar with the literature or the word " Terrorism", then you realize that this is a fool’s errand.There is little consensus among the Inteligencia or academics on who practices terrorism and what constitutes terrorism; let alone the military, intelligence agencies, the judicial system, and government who formulate the definition and meaning to their own need and requirement

Now the word terrorism was formulated and born during French Revolution of 1789 as the label used by the establishment to describe the conduct of revolutionaries and vice-versa.

"Inside a Revolutionary Committee during the Reign of Terror"

When did the word terrorism find its way into the English language?

This excerpt from January 30, 1795, edition of the London Times, reporting on the French National Convention in Paris, appears to be the First Mention of the word in English.

The article begins like this:

NATIONAL CONVENTION SITTING OF DEC. 28  Duhem:–You have given proofs that the whole Convention will a Republic (Laughter–Murmurs). It can therefore never be your intention to second the foolish hopes of Aristocracy and Royalism, which are impudently rearing their crests at our very doors, and would re-establish the Constitution of 1791.–(The whole Assembly rose, crying out Viva la Republique!)

Later in the transcript,  Monsieur Brsard utters the word that suddenly was part of the English language, and which occupies more news today.

Brzard.–“There exists more than one system to overthrow our liberty. Fanaticism has raised every passion; Royalism has not yet given up its hopes, and Terrorism feels bolder than ever.”

The difficulty in defining “terrorism” is in agreeing on a basis for determining when the use of violence (directed at whom, by whom, for what ends) is legitimate; therefore, the modern definition of terrorism is inherently controversial.

UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 9, 1994), titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," contains a provision describing terrorism:

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them;

Definitions of terrorism in other UN decisions

In parallel with the criminal law codification efforts, some United Nations organs have put forward some broad political definitions of terrorism.

UN General Assembly Resolutions

A 1996 non-binding United Nations Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, was included in UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, which described terrorist activities in the following terms:

1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;
2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them;

UN Security Council

As per the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) condemned terrorist acts as:

 Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature;

High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change

The United Nations' High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change was created in 2003 to analyze threats and challenges to international peace and security and to recommend action based on this analysis.It was chaired by former Prime Minister of Thailand Anand Panyarachun

The panel focused on state terrorism and asked its member states to set aside their differences and to adopt, in the text of a proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the following political "description of terrorism":

“That definition of terrorism should include the following elements:

(a) recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity;
(b) restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in a time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols;

(c) reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004);
(d) description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.

Proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism

Since 2000, the United Nations General Assembly has been negotiating a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The definition of the crime of terrorism, which has been on the negotiating table since 2002, reads as follows:

1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or

(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph

1 (b) of this article, resulting in or likely to result in a major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.

2. Any person also commits an offense if that person makes a credible and serious threat to commit an offense as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offense as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

4. Any person also commits an offense if that person:

(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offense as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this article;

(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offense as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this article; or

(c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offenses as set forth in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:

(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offense as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article; or

(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offense as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

Deterrence Theory (From Sociology Point of View)

Introduction

Professor Nigel Walker (1980) Director of the UK Institute of Criminology, argued that ‘limiting principles’ exist indicating when the criminal law should or should not be used, eg.

• It is better to prevent than punish
• The law should not be used to penalize behavior that does no harm;
• The law should not be used to compel people to act in their own best interests.; etc.

Deterrence is founded on the first mentioned principle. However, deterrence is never the sole or primary goal of the law (legal system).

Defining Deterrence

Deterrence involves the threat of punishment via some form of sanction.Deterrence is a way of achieving control through fear. 

If motorists do not refrain from offending out of fear of consequences they are, by definition, not deterred.

Deterrence, in general, is the control of behavior that is affected because the potential offender does not consider the behavior worth risking for fear of its consequences.

Beyleveld (1979) defines the essence of deterrence by two criteria:

Given X’s negative attitude towards the imagined experience of undergoing what he believed were the actual penalties he risked if he committed C1., his positive motivation to commit C1, and the chance he believed existed of having what he believed were the risked penalties being inflicted upon him if he committed (or attempted to commit) C1, and the chance he believed existed of successfully fulfilling his motivation to commit.C1, X “decided” that the personal utility of not committing C1 exceeded the personal utility of committing (or attempting to commit C1 . (16) This ‘calculation’ of utility was the reason why X did not commit C1. (Whatever other factors may have weighed towards X not committing C1,this calculation was necessary for X not to have committed C1, and the calculation alone or in conjunction with other factors was sufficient for X not to have committed C1).” (p.209)

A “deterrent effect” of sanctions is the preventive effect of the sanction(s) resulting from the fear that the sanction(s) will be implemented.
Thus “deterrence” refers to any process by which the threatened act is not committed (or is at least hindered) because of the deterrent sanction. Strictly defined (Beyleveld 1979,p.207) 

“A person is deterred from offending by a sanction if, and only if, he refrains from that act because he fears the implementation of the sanctions, and, for no other reason.”

Deterrence is therefore but one compliance-gaining mechanism.

How Does the Deterrence Operate?

The mere presence or introduction of a sanction may hinder or prevent an offense in a number in different ways:

1. Knowledge of the sanction affects the perception of the cost of offending so that compliance is seen as more attractive than offending;
2. Knowledge of the sanction, coupled with a belief in the sanctity of law or unquestioning legal authority, may be sufficient for compliance;
3. Sanctions may also have moral-educative and habituative effects so that they may be causally involved in the generation of moral beliefs and inhibitions, and laws may be obeyed purely by force of habit;
4. The implementation of sanctions, rather than the mere threat may reduce offenses by incapacitating potential offenders, reforming them or by creating via stigmatization of the offender, informal pressures to comply. 

Deterrence refers to some combinations of these different mechanisms but for strict usage  (i) above must always be present or else the compliance gaining strategy is something other than deterrence. This statement refers to the notion that people weigh up the costs and benefits in deciding not to offend and the cost is the penalties that are threatened.

The philosophy underpinning deterrence is that the risk to the lawbreaker must be made so great and the punishment so severe, that people believe they have more to lose than to gain from the offense.

Deterrence in the literature, and in practice, is usually only in reference to a legal sanction but non-legal sanctions such as fear of ostracism or the disapproval of others are also capable of acting as deterrents.

Total War: Origin & Overview

Total war is a military conflict in which nations mobilize all available resources in order to destroy another nation's ability to engage in war. Total war has been practiced for centuries, but outright total warfare was first demonstrated in the nineteenth century and flourished with conflicts in the twentieth century. When one side of a conflict participates in total war, they dedicate not only their military to victory but the civilian population still at home to working for victory as well. It becomes an ideological state of mind for those involved, and therefore, represents a very dangerous methodology, for the losses are great whether they win or lose.

With the advent of nuclear weapons, the threat of total devastation to the earth and humankind through nuclear warfare in the mid-twentieth century caused a change in thinking. Such a war does not require the mobilization of the whole population, although it would result in their destruction. Since that time, therefore, the arena of war has retreated to smaller powers, and major powers have not been involved in a total war scenario.

However, this has not necessarily reduced the casualties or the suffering of those involved in wars and the threat of widespread violence remains. Ultimately, humankind must move beyond the age of resolving differences through acts of violence, and establish a world in which war, total or otherwise, no longer exists.

The concept of total war is often traced back to Carl von Clausewitz and his writings Vom Kriege (On War), but Clausewitz was actually concerned with the related philosophical concept of absolute war, a war free from any political constraints, which Clausewitz held was impossible. The two terms, absolute war, and total war, are often confused:

Clausewitz's concept of absolute war is quite distinct from the later concept of "total war." Total war was a prescription for the actual waging of war typified by the ideas of General Erich von Ludendorff, who actually assumed control of the German war effort during World War One. Total war in this sense involved the total subordination of politics to the war effort—an idea Clausewitz emphatically rejected, and the assumption that total victory or total defeat was the only options

A U.S. poster

produced during

World War II.

Indeed, it is General Erich von Ludendorff during World War I (and in his 1935 book, Der Totale Krieg—The Total War) who first reversed the formula of Clausewitz, calling for total war—the complete mobilization of all resources, including policy and social systems, to the winning of the war.

There are several reasons for the changing concept and recognition of total war in the nineteenth century. The main reason is industrialization. As countries' natural and capital resources grew, it became clear that some forms of conflict demanded more resources than others. 

For example, if the United States was to subdue a Native American tribe in an extended campaign lasting years, it still took much fewer resources than waging a month of war during the American Civil War. Consequently, the greater cost of warfare became evident. An industrialized nation could distinguish and then choose the intensity of warfare that it wished to engage in.

Additionally, this was the time when warfare was becoming more mechanized. A factory and its workers in a city would have a greater connection with warfare than before. The factory itself would become a target because it contributed to the war effort. It follows that the factory's workers would also be targets. 

Total war also resulted in the mobilization of the home front. Propaganda became a required component of total war in order to boost production and maintain morale. Rationing took place to provide more material for waging war.

There is no single definition of total war, but there is general agreement among historians that the First World War and Second World War were both examples. Thus, definitions do vary, but most hold to the spirit offered by Roger Chickering:

Total war is distinguished by its unprecedented intensity and extent. Theaters of operations span the globe; the scale of battle is practically limitless. Total war is fought heedless of the restraints of morality, custom, or international law, for the combatants are inspired by hatreds born of modern ideologies. Total war requires the mobilization not only of armed forces but also of whole populations. The most crucial determinant of total war is the widespread, indiscriminate, and deliberate inclusion of civilians as legitimate military targets

Reference: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org

Erich Ludendorff's Concept of Total War

General Erich Ludendorff, the ‘Brains’ of the Imperial German war machine for the last two years of the war and progenitor of the German concept of ‘Total War’. On the right is the implementation of gas at Flanders, an extension of the idea that the war had to be fought with every tool, every tactic, every strategy that could be put forth for the very survival of the nation.


"The military staff must be composed of the right men, of the best and ablest men, efficient in the domain of war on land, on the sea, and in the air, in propaganda, war techniques, economics and politics, and they must be intimately acquainted with national life... They have no right to give orders."  - Erich Ludendorff
The last two years of the Great War for Germany are a great illustrative example as to the Ludendorff concept of ‘total war’.By late 1916, both Ludendorff and Hindenburg had effectively phased Wilhelm II and much of the Reichstag and diplomatic elements of the government from the decision making processes and were unilaterally making said decisions devoid of a clear chain of responsibility.

They were, in effect, the perpetual military dictators of Imperial Germany for the remainder of the war.

In Ludendorff’s concept of ‘total war’, the military was the goto, be all for any and all decisions, both political and diplomatic, as they had the chance, whether minute or massive, of influencing the war effort. In effect, the civilian aspects of the government only made policy in response to the needs of the military, not vice-versa, whatever the military needed it received. This concept reserved no place for strategic input by the civilian statesman in the government, the military command was the totality of power within the government and the final body of decision with any policies that had a nationwide effect.

True to the maxim of ‘Prussia is an Army with a State’, Ludendorff envisioned that the military would become the central component of the government which fell in line with his Social Darwinism which saw the notion of ‘peace’ as a temporary reality that interspliced the various period of war that came to dominate the globe and was the main diplomatic tools nations chose to wield.

Ludendorff chose to take this concept to the next level with a more real politik approach as to the strategic aims a ‘total war’ envisioned in accomplishing:

Ludendorff specified the missing strategic aim: ‘Total war is not only aimed against the armed forces but also directly against the people.’
Although the idea was ultimately legitimized by a defensive political objective –– survival of the nation –– this strategic aim had to be pursued by offensive means. The best security for the nation followed from the total annihilation of other nations. Total war thus involved the total mobilization by the total state for the pursuit of total –– political and strategic –– aims.

However horrific we might now think Ludendorff’s product was, this was a coherent and seemingly practical concept of war that was adjusted directly to political demands.
For Ludendorff, war didn’t just end with the defeat of your opponent, it had to be concluded to finality, the ultimate annihilation of any nation that threatened the very survival of one’s own.

This was a more….extreme take on the Clausewitzian principle of the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces by arguing that in the Modern Age, this goal was no longer a possibility and had to be taken one step further, the complete elimination of every citizen as an enemy and therefore a legitimate target as a potential resource for further conflict.

In essence, ‘total war’ for Ludendorff was just that, the very ‘life and death’ struggle, David and Goliath-esque conflict of nations where the stronger came out on top through the ruthless prosecution of a war that vindicated the principles of Social Darwinism.

He argued that the entire physical and moral forces of the nation should be mobilized at all times, because, according to him, peace was merely an interval between wars.

Ludendorff was a Social Darwinist who believed that war was the "foundation of human society," and that military dictatorship was the normal form of government in a society in which every resource must be mobilized.

Historian Margaret Anderson notes that after the war, Ludendorff wanted Germany to go to war against all of Europe and that he became a pagan worshiper of the Nordic god Odin; he detested not only Judaism but also Christianity, which he regarded as a weakening force.

Murphy's Law of Combat

• If the enemy is in range, so are you.
• Incoming fire has the right of way.
• Don't look conspicuous, it draws fire.
• There is always a way.
• The easy way is always mined.
• Try to look unimportant, they may be low on ammo.
• Professionals are predictable, it's the amateurs that are dangerous.
• The enemy invariably attacks on two occasions: 

a. When you're ready for them                 

b. When you're not ready for them.

• Teamwork is essential, it gives them someone else to shoot at.
• If you can't remember, the claymore is pointed at you.
• The enemy diversion you have been ignoring will be the main attack.
• A "sucking chest wound" is natures way of telling you to slow down.
• If your attack is going well, you have walked into an ambush.
• Never draw fire, it irritates everyone around you.
• Anything you do can get you shot, including nothing.
• Make it tough enough for the enemy to get in and you won't be able to get out.
• Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
• If you are short of everything but the enemy, you are in a combat zone.
• When you have secured an area, don't forget to tell the enemy.
• Never forget that your weapon is made by the lowest bidder.  
• Friendly Fire Isn't.

J.F.C. Fuller: His View On Politicians & National Force

John F.C. Fuller was one of the leading theorists on armored warfare during the 1920s and 1930s. During World War-I he served in the newly formed Tank Corps, and responsible for implementing the tank on the European battlefield. Even though the tank faced serious problems and often broke down. 
Fuller was able to see the potential of this new weapon and its impact on warfare (Fuller 1993). Fuller was a strong supporter of understanding how technological advances could affect the conduct of war and then apply it on the battlefield.

Fuller‟s writings span nearly 6 decades, covering topics such as mysticism and cabbala, news reports, military theory, and history. In The Reformation of War (1923) and Foundations of the Science of War (1926), Fuller presented his views on war as a scientific activity. 
The misconduct of World War I led Fuller to believe that the use of force needed a better foundation – a scientific foundation. Fuller believed that the two world wars of the 20th century showed lack of understanding of how military force should be directed in order to obtain the true objective of war: a better peace (Fuller 1993).

Fuller argued for a strong political control of the military forces and believed that a great cause of war is the lack of civil control of the military, or as Fuller wrote: “due to the existence of a hiatus between the mentalities of the nation and its army” (Fuller 1923: 11). Fuller explains: “It frequently arises, however, especially in prosperous nations, that the national will to hunt for wealth is so great that it monopolizes all their efforts, and, consequently, that little thought is given to the maintenance and protection of their wealth through military action. In these circumstances, an army, which should be of the nation, becomes separated from it”. 

Fuller underlines the importance of a strong civil presence in the study of war: “To restrict the development of war by divorcing it from civil science is to maintain warfare in its present barbarous and alchemical form. To look upon war as a world force and attempt to utilize it more profitably is surely better” (Fuller 1993: 32). Fuller argued that politicians should take an active role in the development of their armed forces because these forces should serve the interests of the nations formulated by the politicians. And in order for politicians to take a constructive role in this development, they need to be educated. 

Fuller writes in the preface to The Reformation of War “I have not written this book for military monks, but for civilians, who pay for their alchemy and mysteries” (Fuller 1923: xii), and sums up his efforts in the epilogue: “In order to protect our homes and our institutions we must not only protect our army and look upon it as our shield against adversity, but we must determine whether the shield we have is worthy to protect us. 

In the book, he examined the possibilities of future warfare in order to lead up to this conclusion.

"I feel that I have written enough to enable any intelligent citizen, after he has studied what I have said, to turn to the army he is paying for in order to maintain the peace which he enjoys and to say: "Thou art, or thou art not, found wanting” (Fuller 1923: 282-283).Fuller wanted to create a manual for politicians so that they could better understand how the use of force should be applied in order to serve the nation‟s interests."

Conflict :Origin and Meaning

Conflict and mankind both have born together. It is an essential feature of society. Men have fought even when there were no arms and tools of violence hasn’t invented, and as Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall quoted “the starting point of understanding the war is the understanding of human nature”.

From birth, a baby begins the journey of conflict by crying, which is a flash of conflict. As he grows up, he bites with his teeth or scratches with the nails on his tiny fingers when he is upset. This presupposes that men will continue to fight as long as they have emotions that have the potential to love or hate; to be happy or sad; to be pleased or angry. So long as man has other men around him, there will be issues of disagreement, because interest differs and interests do clash, which may lead to disagreement or confrontation. A community or society of men thus creates room for explosive attitudes and relations. 

When seen from the extremist and religious point of view; conflict represents one of the two nature of man ‘evil’ and ‘cooperation’. The conflict thus dwells in disagreement, anger, hatred, destruction, killing or war. Any effort capable of charging and changing the political or social environment is likely to result in conflict. Greed, covetousness, self-centeredness, discontent, envy, arrogance, rudeness, impunity, among other acts, is capable of producing a breakdown of human relations. In a way, these vices are innate attributes of the ‘conflict nature’ of man.

What is Conflict?

As per Oxford Dictionary conflict is “A serious disagreement or argument, typically a protracted one”.

Pruitt and  Rubin 1986 “Conflict means perceived divergence of interest or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously”

Conrad 1990 “Conflicts are communicative interactions among people who are interdependent and who perceive that their interests are incompatible, inconsistent, or in tension.”

Folger, Poole, and Stutman 1997 “Conflict is the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals”

Nicholson, 1992 “Conflict is an existing state of disagreement or hostility between two or more people”.

Thus one can say that when 2 parties do not an accord and have different views and objectives on the same issue which often result in the pursuit of incompatible goals. Put differently, conflict means collision course; it also refers to opposition to existing view, stand, or position.

Political conflict, on the other hand, is counteracting of parties (political subjects) expressed in certain actions directed against each other.

Goal incompatibility means totally opposite objectives or motives. For example with the end of World War 2 USA and USSR engaged in total opposite type of state economy i.e. USA (capitalist) and USSR (socialist) from 1945 till 1990s which is often referred by the people as COLD WAR where the term ‘WAR’ is referred to the conflict of ideologies and foreign policy.

It is, however, important to know that conflict does not always denote war. While all wars are a state of conflict, all conflict situations may not be a war situation. At the various occasion, conflict is referred to different perception which not results in hostility. Here conflict is the only difference in perception on an issue or situation.

For example; The Syria and Iraq crisis can be referred to as ‘conflict’ and because ISIS is an illegitimate Islamist group that seeks unconventional means to destabilize the state and impose their self-defined laws. Here government have not officially declared war but have targeted criminal insurgents and groups within the state. The conflict thus differs from the war as a conflict is a general definition of a state of chaos, including that of war situations; while war is a legally declared course of action by constitutionally recognized groups.

Theories of Air power:The Command of the Air - G. Douhet

General Giulio Douhet (30 May 1869 – 15 February 1930) was an Italian general and air power theorist. He was a key proponent of strategic bombing in aerial warfare. He was a contemporary of the 1920s air warfare advocates Walther Wever, Billy Mitchell and Sir Hugh Trenchard.

In 1921. The same year he completed a hugely influential treatise on strategic bombing titled The Command of the Air and retired from military service soon after Douhet’s theories on airpower have had a lasting effect on airpower employment.

The major premise of Douhet’s theory was his belief that during the war, a quick victory could be won by early air attack on the enemy’s vital centers, while surface forces worked to contain the enemy on the ground. Douhet differed from other prominent early theorists by proposing that civilian populations be directly targeted as part of the air campaign.

Key Aspects of Douhet’s Theories:

• Major Assumptions
• Thoughts on Targeting
• Thoughts on Air Exploitation

Major Assumptions:

• Airpower is inherently offensive; the bomber will always get through
• All future wars will be total wars
• Civilian morale can be diminished by direct attack
• The dominance of the defensive form of ground warfare is permanent

Thoughts on Targeting:

The first step is command of the air; the next priority is destroying vital centers and civilian moral targets.

Thoughts on Air Exploitation:

Once command of the air is won, it must be used to punish the civilians, so that they will coerce their own government to come to terms in order to end the suffering. This will happen so rapidly that total suffering will be less than that experienced in the trenches.

Implications of Douhet’s Theories:

• Organization for War
• Role of Other Armed Forces
• Force Structure
• Technology Requirements

Organization for War

In order to bring about victory over the enemy before your own civil morale collapses, you must organize airpower under a separate air force.

Roles of Other Armed Forces

Other armed forces will only stand on the defensive until the air force offensive has been decisive.

Force Structure

The army and navy will be structured to achieve economy of force. All the mass possible will be built into the air force.

Technology Requirements

Only one type of airplane is required—the battle plane. It will be of moderate speed, long range, and heavily armored for self-protection. If escort protection is required, battle planes will be made part of the strike package, armed only with self-defensive weapons. Everything not put into the battle plan is a diversion that weakens the main effort and reduces the probability of success. Battles plane would have a combination of high-explosive, incendiary, and gas bombs to have a synergistic effect.

Influence in Italy

His influence on Italy was quite significant, in that he helped bring about the development of an air ministry and separate air force under Mussolini.Colonel Billy Mitchell shared many of Douhet’s beliefs and also corresponded with Count Caproni (who was closely associated with Douhet in the articulation of his theory) on airpower employment. The communication between many of the early theorists promoted a vital dialogue in formulating ideas on airpower.

Influence on the United States

• His influence on the United States was somewhat indirect. Douhet’s contemporary, Count Caproni, was trying hard to sell his bomber to the U.S. Caproni was also closely associated with Douhet in the articulation of his theory. Colonel Edgar Gorrell, an early advocate of strategic bombing, met with Caproni and later had an influence on the initial development of the Air Service Strategic Bombing Theory.
• Several U.S. airpower theorists shared Douhet’s view on strategic bombardment. It can be assumed that Douhet had an influence in the formulation of airpower thought during the period. Portions of his book Command Of The Air were translated and incorporated into the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) curriculum. The ACTS would produce the airpower architects of the strategic bombing campaign of World War II.

Heartland theory : Halford Mackinder

The Geographical Pivot of History, sometimes simply as The Pivot of History is a geostrategic theory, also known as Heartland Theory. "The Geographical Pivot of History" was an article submitted by Halford John Mackinder in 1904 to the Royal Geographical Society that advanced his Heartland Theory. In this article, Mackinder extended the scope of geopolitical analysis to encompass the entire globe.

Supported by five diagrams, it was published by the Society in April 1904 together with comments by several students of geography. Probably few who read the lecture in 1904 guessed that Figure 5, bearing the caption "The Natural Seats of Power," would become one of the most famous maps of our time. It embodied one of the most thought-provoking views of the world in the twentieth century and has exercised a profound influence on foreign affairs and on history.

Pictures 1-5 from "The Geographical Pivot of History(1904)"

The Heartland consists of Russia and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)

In the Heartland theory, Mackinder actually engages geography in international politics both literally and figuratively. Literally, the Heartland theory pointed out that, Eurasia is strategically the most advantageous geographical location (See: Figure). 

On the other hand, figuratively this theory put emphasis on the centrality of the Eurasian region. Mackinder stated that in the context of the global geopolitical processes, the Eurasian continent is found in the center of the world politics. Under this statement, he suggested that the state that dominated the Heartland would possess the necessary geopolitical and economic potential to ultimately control the world politics. Although the Heartland Theory faced much criticism in the decades since its publication, rather the study aims to just how far the philosophy is rational as well as influential in the contemporary environment of international politics.

He asserted that the European civilization was the product of outside pressure. His account of Europe and European history, regarding it as the result of many centuries of struggle against invasions from Asia, proceeded from the same idea. He believed that Europe’s advance and expansion were stimulated by the need to respond to the pressure coming from the center of Asia. Accordingly, it was the Heartland (where the continental masses of Eurasia were concentrated) that served as the pivot of all the geopolitical transformations of historial dimensions within the World Island.

He pointed out that the Heartland was in the most advantageous geopolitical location. Aware of the relative nature of the conception “central location,” Mackinder pointed out that in the context of the global geopolitical processes, the Eurasian continent is found in the center of the world, with the Heartland occupying the center of the Eurasian continent. His doctrine suggested that the geopolitical subject (actor) that dominated the Heartland would possess the necessary geopolitical and economic potential to ultimately control the World Island and the planet.

Principles of War

The Principles of War are the principles expressing the rules of military thought and actions that serve as the permanent basis for combat doctrine. The application of the Principles of War differs at different levels and for different operations. Their relative importance can be expected to vary from event to event.

The list of principles is a methodological tool that differs from army to army and from era to era. While the principles remain the same, the list morphs according to time and place, with application always dependent on context.


The Principles of War have evolved over a long period of time. The evolution can be categorized into three stages:

• Pre-BC to Napoleonic war era.
• Napoleonic era to the end of World War II.
• Post-World War II era.

Pre-BC to Napoleonic War Era

Kautilya: Two remarkable treatises in the pre-BC era from Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Kautilya’s Arthashastra is the oldest treatise known to exist which throws some light on the ancient Indian strategic culture. Kautilya enunciated the following factors involved in planning a campaign:

• Power in terms of strength of fighting forces, enthusiasm and energy.
• Place of operation, type of terrain and selection of ground of own choosing.
• Time of military engagement.
• Season for marching towards the battleground.
• When to mobilise different types of forces.
• The possibility of revolts and rebellions in the rear.
• Likely losses, expenses, and gains.
• Likely dangers.

Sun Tzu: Around 500 BC, Sun Tzu in his book, The Art of War, captured how military operations are influenced by uncontrollable factors. The major guidelines that Sun Tzu used to explain how military operations should be conducted are deception, intelligence, initiative, maneuver, logistics, leadership, and morale. Niccolo Machiavelli: Niccolo Machiavelli published his book, The Art of War, in 1521. Machiavelli puts forth what he calls general rules for military discipline. Some of the conclusions that can be drawn from his rules are: the importance of morale, security, surprise, discipline, need for reserves, know yourself and know your enemy, use of terrain, logistics, intelligence, and objective.

Maurice de Saxe: Maurice de Saxe was one of the most successful and colorful military leaders in Europe. The theory of Saxe is found in his book Reveries, which was published in 1757. Saxe did not present a list of principles, rules or maxims in his work. But in his short book, he provided clear instructions. Saxe placed emphasis on the need for administration, logistics, morale, deception, initiative, leadership and discipline.

Frederick the Great: One man who learned from the theories of Saxe was Frederick the Great. Frederick’s book, Instructions for the Generals, is the theory of a great military commander. Though he offered no list of principles, Frederick’s book does offer maxims for success. The aspects that Frederick the Great stressed in his work are logistics, maneuver, security, cultural awareness, morale, initiative, and leadership.

Napoleonic Era to World War II

Napoleon: The successes of Frederick the Great were dwarfed by the man some call the greatest military leader of all time. Napoleon fought more battles than Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar combined. His methods revolutionized warfare and dominated military thinking for most of the 19th century. The military exploits of Napoleon contributed greatly to the evolution of the Principles of War. Napoleon never wrote his theories of war, but his maxims were recorded and provide some insights to his genius, Napoleon’s maxims clearly illustrate what he thought to be important for victory in war.
Napoleon points to discipline, leadership, momentum, maneuver, mass, firepower, logistics, intelligence, morale, security, initiative, objective and unity of command.

Jomini: The most important theorist to interpret the successes of Napoleon was Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869). Jomini perhaps did more for the Principles of War than any theorist before him and he certainly became the catalyst for those who would follow. Jomini, born in Switzerland, joined the French Army under Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon recognised Jomini and, in admiration of his brilliant mind, awarded him with a regular Colonel’s Commission. However, he was denied promotion as a result of the treachery of Berthier, Napoleon’s Chief of Staff and his arch rival. Jomini resigned from the French Army and accepted a commission as full general in the Russian Army under Alexander. He founded the Nicholas Military Academy in Moscow in 1832. Before his death at the age of 90, Jomini wrote 27 volumes on the subject of military history and theory. Jomini wrote a summary of the Art of War. He defined the principles in four maxims:

• How men should be directed at decisive points against enemy lines of communication while protecting your own.
• Manoeuvre with strength against enemy weakness.
• Throw the mass of force onto the enemy’s decisive point.
• A mass force so it is not only used against the decisive point but at the proper time with the proper amount of force.

Carl von Clausewitz: Carl Von Clausewitz, 1780-1831, a prolific writer on the strategy of the same period, produced On War and The Principles of War. Jomini and Clausewitz disagreed over the question of whether war is a science or an art. Yet, in many aspects, they were in striking agreement with each other. Carl von Clausewitz was outspoken in his arguments against Jomini’s works. Clausewitz viewed Jomini’s theory as being “one-sided” and strove to provide a more complete, well-rounded approach to the theory of warfare through the creation of numerous works. On War achieved widespread acclaim and was probably his greatest work.
However, while Clausewitz is today considered as an outstanding theorist of war, his works are complex and difficult to read, with his true meaning often obscure. In contrast, Jomini’s lucid and prescriptive works, in particular, his exposition of the fundamental Principles of War, have brought both clarity to military planning and operations, and a valuable, well-used framework for the study and teaching of warfare. Clausewitz may be more significant for scholars, but for two centuries, Jomini has proved of more use to practical military professionals.

Ferdinand Foch: Foch struggled with the moral and material factors of war and attempted to explain them by combining the two. Foch’s ideas reflect the work of another great French soldier, Ardant du Pieq, who wrote about the influence of morale and the human element in war. Foch’s ideas are
credited by some historians to be the birth of the modern list of principles. Foch was able to combine the ideas from both sides of the debate over the Principles of War into his theory, which he insisted to first consist of a number of principles. Foch never claimed how many principles there were, but he listed four: economy of force, freedom of action, free disposition of forces, and security.
World War I forced every country to review its doctrine in the light of the costly lessons learned in the war. The Principles of War again became the subject of debate in most major militaries. Great Britain appointed a committee to review the Principles of War and what role they should have in doctrine. The committee was formed in 1919 and among the invited guests to address the committee was J F C Fuller. Fuller urged the committee to consider the inclusion of the principles in the British military doctrine. Fuller definitely influenced the committee on the need to include the principles of
doctrine and perhaps what form they should take.

Principles of War, Great Britain, 1920

In 1920, the British Army published what they claimed to be the “Principles of War.” The eight principles included a title and a brief definition. They closely resembled Fuller’s principles of strategy. The difference was that the list was titled the Principles of War, not of strategy or tactics. The titles of the eight principles were:

• Maintenance of the Objective.
• Offensive Action.
• Surprise.
• Concentration.
• Economy of Force.
• Security
• Mobility
• Cooperation.

This was not the origin of the Principles of War, just as Fuller’s article was not the origin, but a definite mutation along their long evolutionary path. It was the emergence of the Principles of War into accepted operational terminology, no longer just in theory, but doctrine. In the years that followed, many militaries, including of the United States, would adopt the Principles of War into doctrine, but it was the British who did it first.
The United States Army published the Principles of War in a doctrine barely a year after the British Army. Like the British Army, the United States Army was also influenced by the work of J F C Fuller. Unlike the British, who expanded on the list of Fuller, the United States adopted Fuller’s list completely, with only one exception: adding the principle of simplicity.

During World War II, one of the most famous leaders in the British Army was Field Marshal Bernard I Montgomery. During the war, Montgomery published several pamphlets for his forces. In one pamphlet, he listed eight Principles of War significantly different from those published at the time. Montgomery introduced air power, administration, and morale to the modern list; he also adopted the principle of simplicity. After the war, Montgomery led the way to change the Principles of War in the British doctrine. The British adopted ten principles which have remained very similar to this day.

Post-World War II Era

In 1949, the Principles of War that were adapted to the US doctrine were:

• The Objective.
• Simplicity.
• Unity of Command.
• The Offensive.
• Manoeuvre.
• Mass.
• Economy of Forces.
• Surprise.
• Security.

Subsequently, the US Army doctrine, Operation Field Manual FM 100 – 5, has been revised number of times. However, the basic Principles of War remain the same. It is by and large true for all the other armed forces of the world.

Analysis of the Present Principles of War

British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare publication 0-01 (JWP 0-01) dated October 2001 gives the Principles of War as:

• Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.
• Maintenance of Morale.
• Offensive Action.
• Security.
• Surprise.
• Concentration of Force.
• Economy of Effort.
• Flexibility.
• Cooperation.
• Sustainability.

In 1990, the US military introduced principles for “Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)” as:

• Objective.
• Unity of Effort.
• Legitimacy.
• Perseverance.
• Restraint.
• Security.

This implied that there is a difference between war operations and other military operations. The US military has since recognised the fallacy of different Principles of War for MOOTW. In the Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Joint Publications (JP–1) the original nine Principles of War (i.e. Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Manoeuvre, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity) are included and three unique Principles of MOOTW – Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy – have been added. These three additional Principles of War are explained below:

Perseverance: The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. The patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is a requirement for success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, economic and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

Legitimacy: The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken.

Restraint: The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations and the national strategic end state.

Some of the Commonwealth countries have followed the British set of Principles of War. It is interesting to note that the German Army has not laid down any Principles of War. This has been done deliberately by them since they want to avoid the dangers of oversimplification and encapsulation of military concepts and principles. The Germans believe that only by an in-depth and continuing study of war can one develop the judgment to make good decisions in specific situations. They think that no simple set of rules or principles can substitute for a true understanding of the complexity of war. The Germans insist that their officers must develop an in-depth knowledge of military history. They could then apply the knowledge and thought processes developed in that study to the specific inevitably unique situation they faced.