Clausewitz: On War (Part-2)

The political object of war
The political object of the war had been rather overshadowed by the law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless. But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty

The political object-the original motive for the war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement. Since we are dealing with realities, not with abstractions, it can do so only in the context of the two states at war. The same political object can elicit differing reactions from different peoples and even from the same people at different times. We can, therefore, take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. The nature of those forces, therefore, calls for a study. Depending on whether their characteristics increase or diminish the drive toward a particular action, the outcome will vary. Between two peoples and two states, there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect-a real explosion.

This is equally true of the efforts a political object is expected to arouse in either state and of the military objectives which their policies require. Sometimes the political and military objective is the same for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases, the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations. But here, too, attention must be paid to the character of each state involved. There are times when, if the political object is to be achieved, the substitute must be a good deal more important. The less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states and between them, the more political requirements in themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.

Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. This brings us to a different question, which now needs to be analyzed and answered.

Only the element of chance is needed to make war a gamble and that element is never absent
It is now quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble-chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with a chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork, and luck come to play a great part in the war. If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war-the means by which war has to be fought-it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which war exists is the danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger

Not only its objective but also its subjective nature makes war a gamble
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war-the means by which war has to be fought-it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which war exists is a danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. Now courage is perfectly compatible with prudent calculation but the two differ nonetheless and pertain to different If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war-the means by which war has to be fought-it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which war exists is a danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. Now courage is perfectly compatible with prudent calculation but the two differ nonetheless and pertain to different psychological forces. Daring, on the other hand, boldness, rashness, trusting in luck is only variants of courage, and all these traits of character seek their proper element-chance.

In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start, there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, a war most closely resembles a game of cards.

War is serious means to serious ends
Such is war; such is the commander who directs it, and such the theory that governs it. War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end, and all its colorful resemblance to a game of chance, all the vicissitudes of passion, courage, imagination, and enthusiasm it includes are merely its special characteristics.

When whole communities go to war-whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples-the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy. Were it a complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting. This, in fact, is the view that has been taken of the matter whenever some discord between policy and the conduct of the war has stimulated theoretical distinctions of this kind. But in reality things are different, and this view is thoroughly mistaken. In reality, war, as has been shown, is not like that. Its violence is not of the kind that explodes in a single discharge but is the effect of forces that do not always develop in exactly the same manner or to the same degree. At times they will expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance of inertia or friction; at others, they are too weak to have any effect. War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy. War moves on its goal with varying speeds; but it always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed in one way or another long enough, in other words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence. If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.

That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy 

War is merely the continuation of policy by other means

We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. The war in general, and the commander in any specific instance is entitled to require that the trend and designs of a policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

Diverse nature of war
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.

At this point, to prevent the reader from going astray, it must be observed that the phrase, the natural tendency of war, is used in its philosophical, strictly logical sense alone and does not refer to the tendencies of the forces that are actually engaged in fighting-including, for instance, the moral and emotions of the combatants. At times, it is true, there might be so aroused that the political factor would be hard put to control them. Yet such a conflict will not occur very often, for if the motivations are so powerful there must be a policy of proportionate magnitude. On the other hand, if a policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back.

All wars can be considered as policy
It is time to return to the main theme and observe that while a policy is apparently effaced in the one kind of war and yet is strongly evident in the other, both kinds are equally political. If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded not as resulting from a just appreciation of affairs, but as it conventionally is-as cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force, could the second type of war appear to be more "political" than the first.

Clausewitz: On War (Part-1)

Definition

If one looks closely he will find that War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.

Clausewitz definition of war: War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.
Force, to counter opposing force, equips itself with the inventions of art and science. Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it. 

Force-that is, physical force, for moral force, has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law is thus the means of war; to impose your will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself. 

The maximum use of force
Kind-hearted people might, of course, think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds; it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war

This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile-even wrong to try and shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality. 

If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another. These are the forces that give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves, however, are not part of the war; they already exist before the fighting starts. To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war it would always lead to logical absurdity. 

Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter since it is the universal element. Even the most savage, almost instinctive, a passion of hatred cannot be conceived as existing without hostile intent; but hostile intentions are often unaccompanied by any sort of hostile feelings-at least by none that predominate. Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples of the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth. The difference, therefore, does not operate in every case, but it does in most of them. Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with a passionate hatred for each other. 

The aim is to disarm the enemy
The aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy and it is time to show that, at least in theory, this is bound to be so. If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not, of course, be merely transient-at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve. Any change that might be brought about by continuing hostilities must then, at least in theory, is of a kind to bring the enemy still greater disadvantages. The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. It follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him--call it what you will-must always be the aim of warfare.

The maximum exertion on strength
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter-though not exclusively—of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it. Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy's power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy's or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes.

War is never an isolated event

As to the first of these conditions, it must be remembered that neither opponent is an abstract person to the other, not even to the extent of that factor in the power of resistance, namely the will, which is dependent on externals. The will is not a wholly unknown factor; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today. War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously. Each side can, therefore, gauge the other to a large extent by what he is and instead of judging him by what he, strictly speaking, ought to be or do. Man and his affairs. however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides alike and therefore constitute a moderating force.

War does not consist of a single short blow
The second condition calls for the following remarks: If war consisted of one decisive act, or of a set of simultaneous decisions, preparations would tend toward totality, for no omission could ever be rectified. The sole criterion for preparations which the world of reality could provide would be the measures taken by the adversary-so far as they are known; the rest would once more be reduced to abstract calculations. But if the decision in war consists of several successive acts, then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated.

But, of course, if all the means available were, or could be, simultaneously employed, all wars would automatically be confined to a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones-the reason being that any adverse decision must reduce the sum of the means available, and if all had been committed in the first act there could really be no question of a second. Any subsequent military operation would virtually be part of the first-in other words, merely
an extension of it.

Yet, as I showed above, as soon as preparations for a war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought; material calculations take the place of hypothetical extremes and if for no other reason, the interaction of the two sides tends to fall short of maximum effort. Their full resources will therefore not be mobilized immediately.

Besides, the very nature of those resources and of their employment means they cannot all be deployed at the same moment. The resources in question are the fighting forces proper, the country, with its physical features and population, and its allies.

The country-its physical features and population-is more than just the source of all armed forces proper; it is in itself an integral element among the factors at work in war-though only that part which is the actual theater of operations or has a notable influence on it.

It is possible, no doubt, to use all mobile fighting forces simultaneously; but with fortresses, rivers, mountains, inhabitants, and so forth, that cannot be done; not, in short, with the country as a whole, unless it is so small that the opening act of the war completely engulfs it. Furthermore, allies do not cooperate at the mere desire of those who are actively engaged in fighting; international relations being what they are, such cooperation is often furnished only at some later stage or increased only when a balance has been disturbed and needs correction.

In many cases, the proportion of the means of resistance that cannot immediately be brought to bear is much higher than might at first be thought. Even when great strength has been expended on the first decision and the balance has been badly upset, equilibrium can be restored. The point will be more fully treated in due course. At this stage it is enough to show that the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces, To be sure, that fact in itself cannot be grounds for making any but a maximum effort to obtain the first decision, for a defeat is always a disadvantage no one would deliberately risk. And even if the first clash is not the only one, the influence it has on subsequent actions will be on a scale proportionate to its own. But it is contrary to human nature to make an extreme effort, and the tendency, therefore, is always to plead that a decision may be possible later on. As a result, for the first decision, effort and concentration of forces are not all they might be. Anything omitted out of weakness by one side becomes a real, objective reason for the other to reduce its efforts, and the tendency toward extremes is once again reduced by this interaction.

Therefore only the element of chance is needed to make war a gamble and that element is never absent

It is now quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble-chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with a chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork, and luck come to play a great part in the war.

In war, the result is never final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort.

PART-2→

Following article is the excerpt from Clausewitz's ON WAR

JOMINI: Art of War

Antoine Henri Jomini

Jomini’s major contribution to the Art of War concern’s the tangible i.e. physical aspect of warfare. Under all his theories on the subject lies the fundamental principle which defined in the below four maxims (Chapter 3: Section: THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WA

(1) To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own.

(2) To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces.

(3) On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.

(4) To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point but that they shall engage al the proper t times with energy.

The Art of War by Jomini is divided into 6 parts:

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy; or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
3. Grand Tactics.
4. Logistics; or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering—the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor Tactics.

Here Strategy defines where to act; Logistics brings the troops to the point/front; Grand Tactics involves how troops would be employed and deployed; Minor Tactics includes integration of infantry, artillery, and cavalry for a combined attack and Engineering focus on the attack and defense of fortification.

Jomini : Biography

The 18th and 19th century were centuries full of conflict for Europe. Napolean's war raged between France and series of 3 coalitions of European Countries from 1792-1815. These conflict also produced few greatest military thinkers of all time.Napolean who often regarded as a great military strategist left no written records of his concepts and his military applications but mostly penned mostly novellas, essays, etc.

But thanks to 2 men for recording analyzing and interpreting his strategy and contributions:

1. Antoine-Henri, Baron Jomini (6 March 1779 – 24 March 1869)
2. Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz[1] (1 June 1780 – 16 November 1831)

Antoine Henri Jomini

Antoine-Henri, Baron Jomini was the first among the military thinkers who analyzed Napoleon’s warfare tactics. Swiss by birth Jomini joined the French Army. He was working backend i.e as a staff officer throughout his career.

In 1806 after publishing his views on the current war with Prussia and his exceptional knowledge of Fredrick the Great's campaign made Napolean appoint him at his headquarters. Later he was offered to join Russian Armed service which he did after the consent of both countries. But was caught in a flux when the war between the France and Russia started which he tackled by engaging as non-combatant in the communications area.

In his later life, he started Military Academy of St Petersburg (1826) in Russia and then retired in France where he advised Napoleon III for the Italian campaign (1859) and died on 22 March 1869, in Paris at the age of 90.

The famous quote for Jomini was “Devin de Napoléon” or the man who guessed what Napoleon was about.

He along with Clausewitz had done for Defence Studies what Adam Smith had done for Economics.

Sun Tzu : Strategy in Art of War

In thirteen chapters, Sun Tzu wrote a remarkable concise work that defines a sophisticated science in a deliberative manner. We can summarize its content in three strategies

• Positional strategy, the methods for mapping the relative strengths and weakness of competitive positions
• Expansion strategy, which identifies and explores opportunities to advance and build up positions.
• Situation response, which specifies the responses required to address a specific competitive situation.

Positional strategy

The first chapter, "Planning," explores the five key elements that define competitive position (mission, climate, ground, command, and methods) and how to evaluate your competitive strengths against those of your competition. This discussion ends with the idea that information in a competitive environment is limited and that perceptions are often very different from reality. This difference between objective and subjective information is one of the principle leverage points for the working of his strategic system.

Chapter 2, "Going to War," defines the economic nature of competition. It explains how success requires making winning pay, which in turn requires limiting the cost of competition and conflict. This chapter is critical to understanding why Sun Tzu teaches "winning without conflict." By definition, conflict is expensive. Beating opponents and winning battles may satisfy the ego, but Sun Tzu considers that goal a foolish one.

The final chapter, "Using Spies," focuses on the most important topic of all: information gathering. It specifically discusses the value and methods of developing good information sources, specifically the five types of sources you need and the way you must manage them. In this final chapter, Sun Tzu makes it clear that all wars are, at their heart, information wars

Expansion strategy

Chapter 3, "Planning the Attack" defines the nature of strength. It is important to understand that by "attack," Sun Tzu means specifically the idea of moving into a new territory, not necessarily battle or conflict. Conceptually, you must expand or advance your existing position in order to survive. While defense is less expensive than advance over the short term, change undermines existing positions, so if they are not advanced, they must fail.

Chapter 4, "Positioning," explains how you must use competitive positions. Your abilities to defend yourself and to advance are both based on your current position. To get where you want to go, you must start from where you are. You do not create the openings or opportunities that you need to advance because the environment is too large and complex to control. Instead, you must learn how to recognize opportunities created by changes in the environment.

Chapter 5, "Force," explores the energy that drives all human endeavors: imagination. One of the reasons competitive environments are chaotic is that creativity makes prediction impossible. The human imagination is infinite. Its infinite capacity makes the possibilities of human wealth and progress infinite as well. However, this creativity must be tied solidly to reality. Creativity doesn't work alone. It must be paired with proven methods, that is, existing knowledge, to be effective. Together, they create what Sun Tzu called force or momentum.

Chapter 6, "Weakness and Strength," examines the "circulatory system" of competitive environments, the underlying mechanism of change. As water flows downstream, there is a natural balance of the forces in nature. Voids are filled. Excesses are emptied. Sun Tzu uses this process to explain the deeper nature of the opportunity. The multitude of characteristics in the environment can be reduced to emptiness and fullness. Most importantly, human needs are all forms of emptiness, and human produce is all forms of fullness. Using opportunities is largely positioning yourself in the environment to tap into the flow between them.

Chapter 7, "Armed Conflict," explains the dangers of direct conflict. Fighting people over resources is tempting if you don't understand the true nature of opportunity and creativity. However, although conflict is best avoided, it cannot always be avoided. In those situations, you must understand how you can tip the balance in your favor in any confrontation. 

Situation response

Chapter 8, "Adapting to the Situation," focuses on the need to adapt to the conditions that you encounter. This chapter serves as the introduction to the next three long chapters. These chapters give a number of specific responses to specific situations. This chapter presents the idea that every situation is unique but that it combines familiar elements. While we must be creative and flexible, we must also work within the rules of "standard responses" and not react out of ignorance.

Chapter 9, "Armed March," describes the different situations in which you find yourselves as you move into new competitive arenas. It is the first of the three most detailed chapters. It explains both what those situations mean and how you should respond to them. Much of it focuses on evaluating the intentions of others.

Chapter 10, "Field Position," examines the three general areas of resistance (distance, dangers, and barriers) and there are six types of field positions that arise from them. This is again a long, detailed chapter filled with specific responses that must be learned. Each of the six field positions that it discusses offers certain advantages and disadvantages, both in terms of defending and advancing future positions.

Chapter 11, "Nine Terrains," describes nine common situations (or stages) in a competitive campaign and the recognition and response required in each. This is the last and the longest of the detailed chapters. These nine situations can be generally grouped into early, middle, and late-stage conditions, and they range from scattering to deadly. In each of these situations, there is one and only one appropriate response.

Chapter 12, "Attacking With Fire," discusses environmental attacks and responses. As the most deadly form of destruction in Sun Tzu's era, fire attacks are the framework for discussing both using and surviving moves aimed at the destruction of an opponent. The chapter does this systematically, examining the five targets for attack, the five types of environmental attacks, and the appropriate responses to such attacks. However, it ends with a warning about the emotional use of weapons. While competition can go this direction, it shouldn't.

Kautilya’s Saptang :Theory of State

Saptanga Theory which has been mentioned in Arthashastra includes all the seven organs of the state which has been separately elaborated among the various volumes of Arthashastra. It explains the role of the king who has been treated as the life of the state and who shall be the defender of Dharma, who is supposed to be Dharmic, enthusiastic, powerful, aggressive, decisive, fearless and free from self-indulgence.
The Mauryan era of ancient India gave the world a significant treatise, the Arthashastra of Kautilya. It offers deep insights into political statecraft. Kautilya is known as the Indian Machiavelli because of his ruthless and shrewd tactics and policies reflecting an approach to statecraft including warfare.

Also Read: Arthashastra: Kautilya on War

Nature of State
The state of ‘nature’ is imagined to be one of total anarchy, in which ‘might be right’.When people were oppressed by Matsya Nyaya, the law of the fish, according to which the bigger fish swallows the smaller ones they selected Manu– son of Vivasvat the king.

It was settled that the king should receive one-sixth of the grain and one-tenth of merchandise and gold, as his due. It was the revenue which made it possible for the king to ensure the security and prosperity of his subjects. People agreed to pay taxes and he ruled by one person in order that they might be able to enjoy well-being and security. In Kautilya’s Arthashastra, there is no explicit theory of social contract as laid down by the contractualist. Neither does Kautilya use the contract to make the king all powerful.

Elements of State
Kautilya enumerated seven prakritis or essential organs of the state. They are as follow

1. Swami (The Ruler)
2. Amatya (The Minister)
3. Janapada (The Population)
4. Durga (The Fortified Capital)
5. Kosha (The Treasury)
6. Danda (The Army)
7. Mitra (Ally and Friend)

Swami(The Ruler)
It is the first and the most important element. Swami means the monarch. He should be a native of the soil and born in a noble family. He should be brave and well learned. He makes all the important appointments and supervises the government. He has to be virtuous and should treat his subjects like his own children. Kautilya has given extensive powers to the monarch but those powers are meant for the welfare of the subjects. In the welfare and happiness of his subjects, lies his own happiness.

Amatya (The Minister)
It refers to the council of ministers as well as the supporting officials and subordinate staffs. They are meant for assisting the monarch in a day to day affairs of the state. Amatya gives suggestions to the king, collects taxes, develops new villages and cities, ensures the defense of the state and all other tasks as assigned by the king.

Janpada (The Population)
It refers to territory and people of the state. The territory of the state should be fertile and should have an abundance of forest, rivers, mountains, minerals, wildlife etc. It should have a good climate. People should be loyal to their king, hard-working, disciplined, religious, ready to fight for their motherland, should pay taxes regularly and happily.

Durga (The Fortified Capital)
It refers to forts. The state should have a sufficient number of forts across its territory at strategic locations for ensuring defense against foreign invasions. Forts should be built near hills/mountains, deserts, dense forests and big water bodies. The garrison soldiers, store food grains for emergency and also serve as a hideout for the king when his life in danger.

Kosha(The Treasury)
This means treasury of the state. Finance is the life blood of any state without which it is almost impossible to run it. Money is needed for paying salaries, building new infrastructure, etc. The treasury should be full of money and valuable metals and gems. It can be increased through taxation and plundering enemy states in war.

Danda(The Army)
It refers to the military. The state should have a regular, large, disciplined and well-trained military. It is crucial for the security of the state. The soldiers should be recruited from those families which are traditionally associated with the military. The soldiers should be paid well and their families should be taken care of in a most suitable way. Proper training and equipment should be made available. Well fed and well-trained soldiers can win any battle. The king should take care of the soldiers and the soldiers will be ready to sacrifice even their life for him.

Mitra (Ally and Friend)
It refers to friends of the king. The monarch should maintain a friendly relationship with traditional friends of his forefathers. He should also make new friendships. He should send gifts and other pleasantries for his friends. They should be helped in times of emergency. They should be loyal. Friends add to the power of the state. They are also important from foreign trade viewpoint.

Role of king
Kautilya gives extensive powers to the kings and attaches an element of divinity. His foremost duty is the protection of the subjects and their property. King’s sources of power revolving around three sources– Prabhu Shakti (the power of the army and the treasury), Manta Shakti (advice of wise men, especially the council of ministers) and Utsah Shakti (charisma). Duties of Kings Kautilya’s Arthashastra does not believe in the ‘Theory of Divine’ origin of the Monarch. According to him, the state is a human institution and it should be manned by a human being. So, the king should be the protector of the dharma of whole society. Arthashastra pointed out duties of kings are:

• Should follow his Rajya dharma.
• Should exhibit attributes, i.e. Atma Vrata (self-control) l Should ease the six enemies— Kama (lust), Krodha (anger), Lobh (greed), Mana (vanity), Mada (haughtiness), and Harsh (overjoy).

System of Law
Although Kautilya’s state theory states the monarchical democracy, the sole authority vested under the king to make law and that it derived from four sources Dharma (sacred law), Vyavhara (evidence), Charita (history and custom) and Rajasasana (edicts of the king).
Arthashastra represents a system of civil, criminal and mercantile law. For instance, the following were codified a procedure for interrogation, torture, trial, the rights of the accused, Constitution of permissible evidence, a procedure for autopsy in case of death in suspicious circumstances, Constitution of (deformation) and procedure for claiming damages, invalid and invalid contract.

The machinery of Government
The Arthashastra catalogs a phalanx of officers called superintendents, lower in importance than the ministerial officers and much below them, belonging to the sixth order, according to remuneration. They are not heads of departments. The superintendents might be as chiefs of sections dealing with various economic and other activities of the government. Most of these sections are the modern business departments. A dual control is exercised over the superintendents. As far as control of the services of the personal and collection of revenue are concerned, they are under the Collector-General.

Conclusion
The Arthashastra is a textbook of practical politics and statecraft. One of the outstanding contributions of Kautilya’s Arthashastra to statecraft and governance in a monarchical state. Hence, Kautilya’s theory of state envisages a rational approach to governance and statecraft which conceptualizes the state and the office of the kingship to be human artifacts

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Machiavelli - Renaissance of Art of war

Summary

Machiavelli's philosophy is based on his pessimistic view of human nature. He has been called a "pagan Augustinian". Aristotle and Plato also called attention to the imperfect nature of man, but Machiavelli rejected their approach. He follows Xenophon more closely. It was Xenophon who took a rational organization, the army and applied the lessons learned in its construction and operation to the problems of society in general. Machiavelli follows his lead in linking military and civil societies.

He goes a step beyond Xenophon when he applies the lessons of military practice to the internal affairs of his civic body. For all his recognition of the failings of human nature, Xenophon could not free himself from the Greek distinction between friend and foe. For him, coercion was to be applied to the enemy, and both the army and the polis were to be based on friendship. Machiavelli does not recognize this distinction. To him everyone is a potential enemy, hence the civic rulers must employ the same measures employed by the general to defeat his enemies. This is the reason Machiavelli makes no distinction between the statesman and military commander and why his approach to politics is a military one.

Just as the unchanging character of human nature is the stable ingredient which makes the study of history important for the statesman, the presence of the man himself at the controls in all human organizations makes the study of his character the basic activity for the successful leader. Machiavelli's state and army are not abstract entities endowed with human characteristics or desires. All decisions are made by men and all evoke reactions in other men.

Machiavelli's insistence on this principle is seen in each of the diverse topics included in this study. For him the proper decision to such questions as whether to form alliances or not, when to invade the enemy territory, when to use the money, how to acquire and control colonies, how to use "peace" offensives, how to organize a community and whether to appease an aggressor or not are all based on an evaluation of the probable reaction of those humans affected by the decision. 

Likewise, his criteria for the selection of a leader and his precepts to guide the leader's actions in command of an army are based on principles of psychology. The reaction of the army is itself governed by an evaluation of the human material available to the leader. Such considerations as the proper type of soldier, the discipline to be developed, the training program to be followed, the most useful armament, the correct logistical procedures, and the proper role of infantry, cavalry and artillery are all made under the assumption that man has been, is, and always will be the central and essential weapon in war.

Based on this assumption, some of Machiavelli's major points are as follows:

1. War between men is inherent and inevitable.
2. War will be total or limited depending on the political objectives involved.
3. Uncontrolled and unprepared for, war is destructive; but properly channelled and prepared for, it can serve socially useful purposes.
4. The proper way to conduct a war is to carry it to the enemy; keep the initiative; maintain exclusive decision-making power; do not try to buy friends; do not remain neutral or passive when danger threatens, however remotely; always present your side as peace loving and leave your opponent every opportunity to retreat or surrender; use subversive agents inside the other society to pave the way; govern acquired territories through local intermediaries; do not risk total victory or defeat with less than all your forces; be prepared to adapt to the times-- to retreat if necessary to await another day.
5. Leadership is a creative activity. It is the highest aspiration of man. It is the essential element in victory. The leader can and should use every means at his disposal to ensure victory, including all manner of psychological tricks and ruses. The leader should educate himself by studying the example of virtuous heroes of the past, especially Roman.
6. The hold which fear and appearances have on the minds of men require the leader to employ techniques designed to take advantage of these human characteristics. In this connection money, religion, stratagems, and necessity all have important roles.
7. The leader must be able to analyze a situation objectively and base his decisions on a careful estimate of the situation. He must not lose sight of his major objective in war, which is the destruction of the enemy's will and/or ability to resist.
8. The army should be a citizen militia, highly trained and well disciplined, organized in small flexible units, armed with weapons for close combat, composed primarily of infantry. Quality is to be preferred to quantity.

Also Read: Sun Tzu's Art of War

Machiavelli's lasting importance is due to the way in which his theoretical structure is firmly grounded in a realistic appreciation of human nature. His uncritical acceptance of his sources led to some errors in his specific examples. The polemical nature of his writing led to some overstatement of position. He failed to appreciate the role of missile weapons in history. He was perhaps over-optimistic in is an expectation that an essentially amateur militia would be able to defeat the professional armies of his day. Nevertheless, much of what he wrote is still valid today. He understood the importance of military factors in the achievement of political objectives, both in foreign and domestic policy. He recognized the close interrelationship between the military organization and the social-political structure of a society. He saw that warfare was no longer going to be the exclusive affair of a specialized class of warrior who fought over large private interests, but the central activity of the then developing state and hence the concern of its rulers and indeed of all its inhabitants. He warned that unless the people understood and participated in military affairs they could not control the army and if they did not control it, it would control them. He emphasized that the creation of an army cannot await the existence of an emergency, but is the result of long and careful planning. He believed that the discipline and other virtues acquired in a properly functioning military organization had great value to the civic life of a community. His appreciation of the importance of psychological factors as being frequently decisive in any confrontation of man by man requires continual renewal in this technological age. He outlines an effective strategy for conquest which has modern imitators. A citizen militia is still important in a modern army as a reserve element, but no major power could achieve its policies today without at least part of its army being professional. Discipline and training are as essential today as they ever were. Weapons are different now, but the principles governing their use are the same.

Since Machiavelli equates political and military affairs so directly, it is not surprising that his guides to action in the military field are so strikingly similar to his pronouncements on political questions. An interesting question then is which came first, the political theory or the military theory. In other words, did Machiavelli derive his military doctrines from political doctrine or the reverse? To attempt to answer this question I have compared his three major books (The Prince, The Discourses and The Art of War).

Machiavelli himself states that he differs from most authors on the subject of rules and methods for a prince. His reference to imaginary republics is a clear attack on political philosophers such as Plato and Dante. The comments on making a profession of goodness refer to the mirror of princes literature in general. He attacks ancient writers while praising ancient statesmen and soldiers. It has been pointed out that The Prince does conform in style to this tradition of a mirror of princes literature, but that in content it is radically different. Machiavelli can be taken at his word, that he does not recommend the precepts of the classical or medieval political theorists generally held in high regard in his time.

In his opinion, the past is generally overrated by critics of contemporary affairs. Men's appetites change, hence they judge differently when they are old than they did when young and they tend to glorify the past. In spite of this, he constantly urges his readers to imitate the ancients.

Machiavelli begins the introduction to Book One of The Discourses with the claim to have opened a new route, to have discovered new principles and systems; to what end he does not say. Antiquity is held in great esteem and imitated by artists; ancient virtue, however, is more admired than imitated. He proposes that we imitate also ancient military and political systems. His route leads to a revival of virtue. The Discourses also represents a departure from anything previously written.

In the introduction to The Art of War Machiavelli discusses the relation between civil and military affairs more explicitly. Men entering the army transform themselves and appear quite different from civilians, but on a closer look at civil and military institutions, a close relationship can be seen. Once again, in this book as in the others, Machiavelli is quite specific in denouncing the contemporary military practice and in recommending the ancient practice, subject to certain modifications of his own design. This book contains less political theory and more military details than the other two, but all three repeat the same arguments. The style and content, however, are noticeably different. Far from having no previous models, this book is copied almost word for word from specific Roman military textbooks. While Machiavelli does not mention who the writers are, he is careful to state his reasons whenever he deviates from them, even in the order in which he treats the subjects.

Machiavelli writes that he does not agree with the most political theory, ancient or modern, nor with contemporary Italian military practice. What he does admire are ancient (Roman) political and military practice and ancient military theory. The ancient political and military practices were in conformity and were expressed more adequately in the military texts and histories than in the political theory books. Contemporary political and military practice is inadequate and is also not expressed adequately in contemporary literature.

In two books then Machiavelli expressly breaks with one tradition and establish new precepts, while in the third he consciously stays as close to another tradition as possible; yet the theories in all three books are almost identical. It would seem unlikely that he would have devised the new precepts in the first books from strictly political considerations and then found that they corresponded exactly to the traditional ones followed in the third book. Evidently, he considered military theory applicable to political problems before he wrote The Prince. This is further shown by reference to his correspondence written while still in office, and especially in his activities on behalf of the militia.

Machiavelli's political theory then is an extension of his military theory, and the whole is based on classical military doctrines. His major contribution then to political theory is the view of the civic body as a proper field for the employment of precepts derived from the military practice

Following article is extracted from: The art of war Machiavelli | Scoop.it

SunTzu : Art of War

Also Read: SunTzu's Thought on War

Arthashastra: Kautilya on War

                                                                   Arthashastra's manuscript                                                                                                                       Source: Wikimedia Commons

Kautilya was a proponent of a welfare state but definitely encouraged war for preserving the power of the state. Kautilya's Arthashastra is a book of 'pure' logic, not taking any religious aspect into account. It deals with the various subjects directly and with razor-like sharpness. The Arthashastra totally contains 5363 Sutras, 15 books, 150 chapters, and 180 Sections. The 15 Books contained in the Arthashastra can be classified in the following manner: Book 1, as a book on 'Fundamentals of Management', Book 2 dealing with 'Economics', Books 3, 4 and 5 on 'Law', Books 6, 7, 8 describes Foreign Policies. Books 9 to 14 concerns subjects on 'War'. The 15th book deals with the methodology and devices used in writing the Arthashastra.



What is interesting to note is that the topic of war is the last subject in Arthashastra. War is always the last option. However, a war in certain cases is unavoidable, hence, preparation and maintenance of the army, the right moves in the battlefield and warfare strategies all are essential in the defense of a country, subjects which Kautilya tackles with the extrasensory precision.

Also Read: Kautilya : Saptang Theory

Economics in Statecraft and War. Kautilya thought that the possession of power and happiness in a state makes a king superior hence a king should always strive to augment his power. Kautilya propounded that war is natural for a state. He said that "Power is strength and strength changes the minds".Economic power has helped shape statecraft. This element of power is very flexible. This aspect of the power is one which Arthashastra concentrates on and has highlighted 'Artha', the economics of the state in the pursuit of power. The quest for power is driven by the satisfaction of the king and his subjects in all the spheres of material well being and social acceptance. This can be achieved by a progressive and robust economy. A corollary to this fact is that the economics of a state can be used to progress the influence of the state over international issues and also used to augment the war waging potential of the state.


Whether a nation has a large or small military, its leadership does understand economics. Economics is a great tool to create conditions for further action or force a nation to change behavior. There are constraints prevalent in the pursuit of sound-economy to further the war waging capability of a state and in turn achieve the power. the resolution of these constraints is the enigma which Kautilya unraveled through Arthashastra.


2. Kautilya presents that for a King to attain these three goals he must create wealth, have armies and should conquer the kingdoms and enlarge the size of his state. This is quite interesting because he in a way does believe that a state's superiority is in its military and economic might which is what later philosophers and rulers have followed. In the case of war, Kautilya advocates the King to be closely involved in the science of war.


3. Classifications of War. Kautilya advocated three types of war: Open war, Concealed war, and the Silent War.In Open-war he describes as the war fought between states, concealed war as one which is similar to guerrilla war and Silent war which is fought on a continued basis inside the kingdom so that the power of the King does not get diluted. He believed that there were three types of kings who go into warfare and it is important to understand the distinction between the types of kings and the appropriate warfare strategy to be selected.


4. Kautilya propounded that state is not considered a massive entity but as one which combines various internal constituents – the king, the fortified city , the countryside, the treasury and the army. The power with which a state can promote its own interests over other states in the neighborhood depends on how close to ideal the internal constituents are. The four devices Kautilya used for deriving practical advice were: relative power, deviations from the ideal, classification by the type of motivation and the influence of the unpredictable. This is the core what Arthashastra addresses as the endeavor is to resolve all the constraints that arise in the quest of the state to gain ascendancy and enhance its power.


5. Warfighting tactics. Kautilya was also very harsh in narrating the exact methods of fighting a war and use of various tools to reduce the strength of a state. Kautilya wrote in detail explaining the war strategy because he was a strong proponent of social structure. He vehemently defends the state and believes that religion and morals are supposed to serve the state. In Kautilya's concept of war, chivalry does not have any place and he is a realist. Kautilya in his Arthashastra and believes that war is a means to an end for wealth and stability. He provided the understanding to resolve all the constraints which emerge to achieve the ends. Kautilya has argued that the primary constraint that a state faces is the economic constraints and many a war has been lost for want of resources. The Arthashastra has guided the king in eliminating the constraints, primarily the economic constraints in the furtherance of its interests. The use of economic strength as a means of states' power has also been highlighted by Kautilya.


6. Kautilya also took the societal structure and King's power as given and never challenged it. His focus was not on war per-se

SunTzu's Thought on War

A statue of Sun Tzu at Yurihama(Tottori)
Japan

Sun Tzu was a Chinese general, military strategist, and philosopher who lived in the Spring and Autumn period of ancient China. Sun Tzu is traditionally credited as the author of The Art of War, a widely influential work of military strategy that has affected both Western and Eastern philosophy.

The Art of War: It presents a philosophy of war for managing conflicts and winning battles. It is accepted as a masterpiece on strategy and has been frequently cited and referred to by generals and theorists since it was first published, translated, and distributed internationally.