Clausewitz: On War (Part-2)

The political object of war
The political object of the war had been rather overshadowed by the law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless. But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself. If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty

The political object-the original motive for the war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement. Since we are dealing with realities, not with abstractions, it can do so only in the context of the two states at war. The same political object can elicit differing reactions from different peoples and even from the same people at different times. We can, therefore, take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. The nature of those forces, therefore, calls for a study. Depending on whether their characteristics increase or diminish the drive toward a particular action, the outcome will vary. Between two peoples and two states, there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect-a real explosion.

This is equally true of the efforts a political object is expected to arouse in either state and of the military objectives which their policies require. Sometimes the political and military objective is the same for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases, the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations. But here, too, attention must be paid to the character of each state involved. There are times when, if the political object is to be achieved, the substitute must be a good deal more important. The less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states and between them, the more political requirements in themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.

Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. This brings us to a different question, which now needs to be analyzed and answered.

Only the element of chance is needed to make war a gamble and that element is never absent
It is now quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble-chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with a chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork, and luck come to play a great part in the war. If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war-the means by which war has to be fought-it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which war exists is the danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger

Not only its objective but also its subjective nature makes war a gamble
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war-the means by which war has to be fought-it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which war exists is a danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. Now courage is perfectly compatible with prudent calculation but the two differ nonetheless and pertain to different If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war-the means by which war has to be fought-it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which war exists is a danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. Now courage is perfectly compatible with prudent calculation but the two differ nonetheless and pertain to different psychological forces. Daring, on the other hand, boldness, rashness, trusting in luck is only variants of courage, and all these traits of character seek their proper element-chance.

In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start, there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, a war most closely resembles a game of cards.

War is serious means to serious ends
Such is war; such is the commander who directs it, and such the theory that governs it. War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end, and all its colorful resemblance to a game of chance, all the vicissitudes of passion, courage, imagination, and enthusiasm it includes are merely its special characteristics.

When whole communities go to war-whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples-the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy. Were it a complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting. This, in fact, is the view that has been taken of the matter whenever some discord between policy and the conduct of the war has stimulated theoretical distinctions of this kind. But in reality things are different, and this view is thoroughly mistaken. In reality, war, as has been shown, is not like that. Its violence is not of the kind that explodes in a single discharge but is the effect of forces that do not always develop in exactly the same manner or to the same degree. At times they will expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance of inertia or friction; at others, they are too weak to have any effect. War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy. War moves on its goal with varying speeds; but it always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed in one way or another long enough, in other words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence. If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.

That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy 

War is merely the continuation of policy by other means

We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. The war in general, and the commander in any specific instance is entitled to require that the trend and designs of a policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

Diverse nature of war
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.

At this point, to prevent the reader from going astray, it must be observed that the phrase, the natural tendency of war, is used in its philosophical, strictly logical sense alone and does not refer to the tendencies of the forces that are actually engaged in fighting-including, for instance, the moral and emotions of the combatants. At times, it is true, there might be so aroused that the political factor would be hard put to control them. Yet such a conflict will not occur very often, for if the motivations are so powerful there must be a policy of proportionate magnitude. On the other hand, if a policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back.

All wars can be considered as policy
It is time to return to the main theme and observe that while a policy is apparently effaced in the one kind of war and yet is strongly evident in the other, both kinds are equally political. If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded not as resulting from a just appreciation of affairs, but as it conventionally is-as cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force, could the second type of war appear to be more "political" than the first.

Clausewitz: On War (Part-1)

Definition

If one looks closely he will find that War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.

Clausewitz definition of war: War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.
Force, to counter opposing force, equips itself with the inventions of art and science. Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it. 

Force-that is, physical force, for moral force, has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law is thus the means of war; to impose your will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself. 

The maximum use of force
Kind-hearted people might, of course, think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds; it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit; each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factors are the counterpoises inherent in war

This is how the matter must be seen. It would be futile-even wrong to try and shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality. 

If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationships to one another. These are the forces that give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves, however, are not part of the war; they already exist before the fighting starts. To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war it would always lead to logical absurdity. 

Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter since it is the universal element. Even the most savage, almost instinctive, a passion of hatred cannot be conceived as existing without hostile intent; but hostile intentions are often unaccompanied by any sort of hostile feelings-at least by none that predominate. Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilized peoples of the mind. The difference, however, lies not in the respective natures of savagery and civilization, but in their attendant circumstances, institutions, and so forth. The difference, therefore, does not operate in every case, but it does in most of them. Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with a passionate hatred for each other. 

The aim is to disarm the enemy
The aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy and it is time to show that, at least in theory, this is bound to be so. If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not, of course, be merely transient-at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve. Any change that might be brought about by continuing hostilities must then, at least in theory, is of a kind to bring the enemy still greater disadvantages. The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. It follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him--call it what you will-must always be the aim of warfare.

The maximum exertion on strength
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter-though not exclusively—of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it. Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy's power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy's or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must again force you both to extremes.

War is never an isolated event

As to the first of these conditions, it must be remembered that neither opponent is an abstract person to the other, not even to the extent of that factor in the power of resistance, namely the will, which is dependent on externals. The will is not a wholly unknown factor; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today. War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously. Each side can, therefore, gauge the other to a large extent by what he is and instead of judging him by what he, strictly speaking, ought to be or do. Man and his affairs. however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides alike and therefore constitute a moderating force.

War does not consist of a single short blow
The second condition calls for the following remarks: If war consisted of one decisive act, or of a set of simultaneous decisions, preparations would tend toward totality, for no omission could ever be rectified. The sole criterion for preparations which the world of reality could provide would be the measures taken by the adversary-so far as they are known; the rest would once more be reduced to abstract calculations. But if the decision in war consists of several successive acts, then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated.

But, of course, if all the means available were, or could be, simultaneously employed, all wars would automatically be confined to a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones-the reason being that any adverse decision must reduce the sum of the means available, and if all had been committed in the first act there could really be no question of a second. Any subsequent military operation would virtually be part of the first-in other words, merely
an extension of it.

Yet, as I showed above, as soon as preparations for a war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought; material calculations take the place of hypothetical extremes and if for no other reason, the interaction of the two sides tends to fall short of maximum effort. Their full resources will therefore not be mobilized immediately.

Besides, the very nature of those resources and of their employment means they cannot all be deployed at the same moment. The resources in question are the fighting forces proper, the country, with its physical features and population, and its allies.

The country-its physical features and population-is more than just the source of all armed forces proper; it is in itself an integral element among the factors at work in war-though only that part which is the actual theater of operations or has a notable influence on it.

It is possible, no doubt, to use all mobile fighting forces simultaneously; but with fortresses, rivers, mountains, inhabitants, and so forth, that cannot be done; not, in short, with the country as a whole, unless it is so small that the opening act of the war completely engulfs it. Furthermore, allies do not cooperate at the mere desire of those who are actively engaged in fighting; international relations being what they are, such cooperation is often furnished only at some later stage or increased only when a balance has been disturbed and needs correction.

In many cases, the proportion of the means of resistance that cannot immediately be brought to bear is much higher than might at first be thought. Even when great strength has been expended on the first decision and the balance has been badly upset, equilibrium can be restored. The point will be more fully treated in due course. At this stage it is enough to show that the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces, To be sure, that fact in itself cannot be grounds for making any but a maximum effort to obtain the first decision, for a defeat is always a disadvantage no one would deliberately risk. And even if the first clash is not the only one, the influence it has on subsequent actions will be on a scale proportionate to its own. But it is contrary to human nature to make an extreme effort, and the tendency, therefore, is always to plead that a decision may be possible later on. As a result, for the first decision, effort and concentration of forces are not all they might be. Anything omitted out of weakness by one side becomes a real, objective reason for the other to reduce its efforts, and the tendency toward extremes is once again reduced by this interaction.

Therefore only the element of chance is needed to make war a gamble and that element is never absent

It is now quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble-chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with a chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork, and luck come to play a great part in the war.

In war, the result is never final
Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigor of the effort.

PART-2→

Following article is the excerpt from Clausewitz's ON WAR

Carl von Clausewitz: Biography

Carl Philip Gottfried von Clausewitz (1 June 1780 - 16 November 1831) was a Prussian general and military theorist who focused on the moral (i.e. psychological) and political aspect of war.
Among all his work his prime piece “On War” was unfinished till his death which was later published by his widow Marie von Bruhl in 1832.

Clausewitz joined the Prussian army at the age of 12 where he first saw combat. After Prussia withdrew from French Revolution he engaged himself in education and joined Institute of Young Officers in Berlin where he evolved into a famous Kriegsakademie.

Impressed by his ability Gerhard von Scharnhorst(a key figure in the Prussian state during the upheavals of the Napoleonic wars and Chief of the General Staff in 1806) sponsored him and later became his mentor and a close friend.After the graduation, he was rewarded with the position of military adjutant to the young Prince August.

Clausewitz work was mainly influenced by Scharnhorst and other Prussian military reformers who perceived French Revolution was an astounding success because it was able to tap the energy of the French People. They believed that if Prussian was to survive as a state it has to do the same. This would require sweeping reforms (Political and Social) both in the state and the army(as both were suffered under the successors of Fredrick the Great). Therefore Clausewitz work was a strong reflection of social and military reforms. However, neither Clausewitz nor his mentor s wanted a social or political revolution but only changes which would help in preserving the independence of Prussia as a state and Power.
But this belief made him the target of both the conservative and the revolutionaries. What would what would one day be called “the primacy of foreign policy” made him odd among the liberals and the radicals who believed the constitutional government was the political goal surpassing all the others. Many writers tried to cast Clausewitz as a political hero or the villain in order to serve their political agendas but all in all, it proved to a futile exercise

Later in 1805 alarmed by the French victories over Austria and Russia; Prussia prepared for war in 1806. Confident in the leadership of Fredrick the Great Captain Clausewitz and other Prussian officers looked forward to the war with France but the timing and the implementation Prussia was poor and inadequate resulting I humiliating defeat at Battle of Jena and Auerstedt. Later at the time of retreat of the army Both Clausewitz and Prince August were captured. In the peace settlement, Prussia lost half of its territory and became an occupied French Satellite state.

The defeat was both a shock and the eye-opener for Clausewitz. He later recorded his impression on war and the socio-political conditions of Prussia In several short articles. He also composed the detailed critique of 1806’s Prussia which was so incisive that it was not published in Germany till 1880. It was titled “observation on Prussia in its great catastrophe”.
Later he started helping in restructuring both the Prussian society and the army in preparation for what he felt was an inevitable struggle against the French. He was responsible for the planning for a national insurrection against the French occupation, a movement that would require the involvement of people’s war along with the much reduced Prussian Army.

But his drive and enthusiasm against the French were not shared by the few including the King who was more concerned with maintaining his position in the much-reduced Prussian state than with any patriotic crusade against the French. In the bid for protecting his throne, he agreed to provide the Napoleon to assist in 1812 invasion of Russia. This proved to be the last straw for Clausewitz as he along with thirty officers resigned from Prussian service and joined the commission in the Russian army in order to continue his resistance against the Napoleon.

But before he left for Russia he prepared an essay on war for a 16-year-old Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (Later King Friedrich Wilhelm-4{1840-1858}) as he was his military tutor. This essay was called “The most important principles of the art of war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince" (usually referred to as the "Principles of War”)

In Russia, Clausewitz spoke French (and English) as did many Russian aristocrats and Russian imperial family as well ethnic Germans in Russia and in Russian Forces but was hobbled for his ignorance of Russian language.

He fought in the slaughterhouse battle at Borodino and saw the disastrous French retreat from Moscow. He also played a key role in negotiating the “Convection of Tauroggen” which resulted in the defection of General H.D.L Yorck von Wartenburg’s Prussia corps from French Army. This move from the general infuriated King but eventually forced Prussia into anti-French coalition resulting directly to Napolean’s defeat and abdication in 1814 and resurrecting of Prussia itself.

As a deception, Scharnhorst arranged for him to serve as Russian liaison officer to Prussia army. But in reality, he was acting as an influential aide to General August von Gneisenau; Prussian Field Marshal and as one of the principal leader of Prussia’s rebirth.

Having done so much to challenge Prussia’s subjugation by France, however, Clausewitz was seen by many as a national hero. Later on, change of sides eventually led to his reinstatement in the Prussian army, as a full colonel in April 1814.

In 1815’s campaign, Clausewitz served as chief of staff of Prussia’s 3rd corps which fought at Ligny successfully disengaging itself from Prussian defeat. Later outnumbered 2-1 it played a crucial role at Wavre resulting in prevention of Marshal Grouchy's forces rejoining Napoleon at Waterloo.

In 1818 the king promoted Clausewitz to major-general and administrative head of General War College in Berlin. Having little to do with actual instruction at the school, Clausewitz spent his abundant leisure time writing studies of various campaigns and preparing the theoretical work which eventually became On War.

Because he had little to do with actual instruction at the school Clausewitz spent his maximum leisure time on writing papers on various campaigns and preparing his work “ON WAR”

Read: Clausewitz theory on war

                                                     

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He later returned to active duty in 1830 and was sent to Polish border as a chief of staff to Field Marshal. Before leaving he sealed all his unfinished manuscripts on the basis that this would free him from the ego or career concerns that might affect his style and conclusions.

Even though the war was averted, Clausewitz remained in the east trying to stop the outbreak of Cholera epidemic but later fall ill with cholera and died on 16 November 1831.He was 51 years old.